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JULIE WEAVER AND CATHERINE 
PALMER, 
APPELLANTS, 
-vs-
BRITE MUSIC ENTERPRISES, 
INC., 
APPELLEE. 
Case No. 950512-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which provides in essential part that an 
appeal may be taken from a District Court to the Appellate Court 
from all final orders and judgements. Jurisdiction is based upon 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(j), 1953 as amended, which 
grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from 
judgments of any court of record for which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3 does not grant the Court of Appeals 
original jurisdiction over this matter. 
This case has been transferred to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
a. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the 
provisions of the parties' contract regarding "carry-over points" 
as a matter of law and within the four corners of the agreement, 
was clear and unambiguous? (Preserved in Transcript for Motion for 
Directed Verdict p. 31; and in Memoranda supporting Appellants' 
post-trial motions R. 733-734, 773). 
b. Whether the trial count erred in application of the 
standard for consideration of the Appellee's motion to dismiss the 
case at the end of the presentation of the Appellants' evidence in 
the jury trial of this matter? (Preserved in Transcript for Motion 
for Directed Verdict p. 17-18). 
c. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the 
provisions of the contract between the parties regarding "carry-
over points" were not ambiguous? (Preserved in Transcript for 
Motion for Directed Verdict p. 31; and in Memoranda supporting 
Appellants' post-trial motions R. 730-731, 734). 
d. Whether the trial court erred in construing the parties' 
contract as a matter of law and in not construing the parties 
contract against the Appellee, which was the scrivener of the 
contract? (Preserved in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict 
pp. 31, 50; and in Memoranda supporting Appellants' post-trial 
motions R. 730). 
e. Whether the trial court erred in failing to interpret the 
"carry-over points" provision of the contract in a manner 
consistent with the eight year course of dealing between the 
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parties, and the representations and admissions of the Appellee's 
executive officers, including one of the principal founders of the 
Appellee, who was also the principal executive officer of the 
Appellee? (Preserved in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict 
p. 21). 
f. Whether the principles of estoppel and waiver preclude the 
Appellee from now asserting that the Appellee also had the right to 
exercise the "carry-over points" redemption provision? (Preserved 
in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict p. 54; and in 
Appellants' post-trial motions R. 698). 
Standard of Review on Appeal 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the Court must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Appellants, against whom the motion was directed, and must resolve 
every controverted fact in their favor. Boskovich v. Utah Constr. 
Co.. 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953). 
A directed verdict is tantamount to granting a motion for a 
nonsuit. On appeal it must be reversed, if the evidence is such 
that reasonable men could arrive at a different conclusion. 
Rhiness v. Dainsie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
The Appellate Court should give no deference to the factual 
findings or legal conclusions of the trial court, but should review 
the facts and apply the proper legal standard de novo. Canfield v. 
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is a claim made by the Appellants, Julie Weaver and 
Catherine Palmer for the breach of sales representative contracts 
which they had entered into with the Appellee, Brite Music 
Enterprises (Brite). Pursuant to the sales representative 
contracts, Julie Weaver and Cathy Palmer could derive various forms 
of compensation. One of the components of compensation allowed the 
accumulation of "points". Pursuant to the use of these points on 
monthly basis, the sales representative could maintain her 
commission at the highest possible level. The contract also 
provided that excess points ("carry-over points") could be 
accumulated for "as long as you [the sales representative] desire". 
The contract provided that a sales representative could, in 
the alternative, cash in her carry-over points pursuant to a 
redemption provision available to the sales representative. This 
redemption right of the sales representative was used periodically 
over an eight year period of time. 
In early 1991, Brite announced that it also had the right to 
exercise the redemption provision, and tendered checks for the 
relatively small redemption price to Weaver and Palmer. Brite then 
denied Weaver and Palmer the right to use their carry-over points 
as they had previously done, thereby causing Weaver and Palmer 
substantial monetary loss. The Appellants assert that the actions 
of Brite constitute a breach of their written agreement. 
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Course of Proceedings 
The original complaint of Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer 
was filed on May 16, 1991 (R. 2-16). The matter was tried to a 
jury on December 6-8, 1994. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of the case in chief of 
Weaver and Palmer, Brite moved for a directed verdict (see 
Transcript of Motion for Directed Verdict p. 5) . Upon the 
conclusion of the argument of the motion, the trial court found 
that there was no breach of the sales representative contract and 
the motion of Brite was granted (Transcript of Motion for Directed 
Verdict p. 60). 
On January 27, 1995, the trial court entered its Final Order 
of Dismissal (R. 687 and Exhibit D attached hereto). Such order 
stated that the trial court found the contract provision to be 
unambiguous. Further that trial court found that Brite also had 
the right to exercise the carry-over redemption provision. In such 
case, the trial court concluded that Brite had not breached its 
agreement with Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer. 
Post-trial motions were briefed to the trial court and oral 
argument on the motions was conducted on April 24, 1995 (R. 795). 
An Order Denying Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motions was entered on May 
1, 1995 (R. 795-796), and this appeal followed. 
Facts 
In the decade of the eighties, the Appellants, Julie Weaver 
("Weaver") and Catherine Palmer ("Palmer") were two of the most 
successful independent sales representatives (Palmer p. 55, 66; 
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Brady pp. 38, 33, 53; Vassel pp. 60)1 of the Appellee, Brite Music 
Enterprises, Inc. ("Brite"). Brite is engaged in the development 
and marketing of music products, including music tapes and books. 
Weaver and Palmer are both residents of Davis County and were 
actively involved in developing sales organizations pursuant to the 
Brite marketing program. Weaver became a sales representative in 
1980 and Palmer became a sales representative in 1982. The trial 
court found that a contractual relationship did exist between the 
parties based upon the 1982 marketing program (the "Program") 
implemented by Brite (see Final Order of Dismissal, January 27, 
1995, paragraph 1; R. 687 and Exhibit D attached hereto). 
The Program provided that the sales representatives would 
receive compensation based upon the sales volume of the 
representative, and of the sales organization or "down-line" of the 
sales representative. The second key component of the Program 
provided that a sales representative could accumulate "points" from 
various sources identified in the Program. 
The principal source for the accumulation of points was the 
sales volume of the sales organization of a representative. The 
accumulated points were applied to a graduated point level of 300, 
600, 900 or 1200 points. The point level at which a representative 
conducted business for a month determined the percentage for the 
computation of the compensation of a sales representative (i.e., at 
1
 Reference to the trial record is designated by the letter R 
and the page number of the referenced material in the record; e.g. 
(R. 687). Reference to testimony given at trial is made by 
designating the surname of the witness and the page in the 
transcript of the testimony of the witness; e.g. (Palmer p. 28). 
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the 1200 point level, the percentage of the sales commissions 
earned by the sales representative would be greater than at lower 
point levels) (Palmer p. 26, lines 9-13). 
The third component of the compensation structure of the 
Program was that a sales representative could earn more points in 
a month than were required to achieve a particular compensation 
level. These excess points could be accumulated for use in future 
months (Palmer p. 27, Brady p. 17). These accumulated points are 
referred to in the Program as "carry-over points." 
The critical aspect of the contractual relationship of the 
parties, and of this case, hinges on the fact that the carry-over 
points could be applied to satisfy the requirements of achieving a 
certain compensation level in a month when the sales representative 
did not earn the requisite points during the month. For example, 
it would be possible for a sales representative who had accumulated 
sufficient points, to wholly cease personal sales operations for 
several months, and yet be entitled to receive compensation at the 
highest point level from the sales made by her sales organization 
or down-line (Palmer p. 27 lines 10-16, Vassel p. 21). 
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The trial court found that "the relevant provision of the 1982 
marketing Program concerning "carry-over points" provided2: 
As you continue to exceed 1200 points per 
month, the increasing carry-over points may 
accumulate for as long as you desire; however, 
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is 
redeemable for a check from Brite for $100. 
Redeeming points in this manner does not 
affect your life-time point accumulation or 
the benefits you may eventually derive 
therefrom." (emphasis added by Appellants) 
The forgoing contractual provision provided both for the 
accumulation of carry-over points and for a cash redemption right 
by the sales representative. The last sentence of this paragraph, 
although also directed to the sales representative (and therefore 
helpful to the construction of the paragraph), relates to other 
benefits and rewards based on a lifetime accumulation of points 
(Brady p. 31, lines 6-14). Though this other reward program is not 
central to the matter now before the Court, this final sentence 
completes the thought of the entire paragraph which describes only 
rights of the sales representatives. The paragraph, by its terms, 
grants no rights to Brite, but only the obligation to accumulate 
the points or pay the redemption price, if the redemption option is 
exercised by the sales representative. 
The factual issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or 
not both contracting parties had the right to exercise the cash 
redemption provision, or whether the redemption right was solely 
that of the sales representative. The legal issue for 
2
 See final Order of Dismissal, January 27, 1995, paragraph 
1, R. 687, and Exhibit D attached hereto. See also, Palmer p. 31, 
lines 9-15. 
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determination by the Court of Appeals is whether the trial court 
erred in failing to submit this factual issue to the jury# by 
resolving this issue as a matter of law on Brite's motion for a 
directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs7 case. 
The evidence produced at the time of the trial of this case 
indicated that, at the end of calendar year 1986, Weaver had 
accumulated 51,568.84 carry-over points and that Palmer had 
accumulate 79,099.68 carry-over points at the end of calendar year 
1987 (Trial Exhibits P-29 and P-57 ;see Exhibits A and B attached 
hereto; Palmer p. 72, lines 18-20). 
Early in her experience with Brite, Palmer had exercised the 
cash redemption provision. At trial, however, she confessed that 
a management employee at Brite had pointed out to her that the 
right to use the carry-over points to maintain the highest point 
level of compensation was at her option, as a sales representative 
(Palmer p. 32) . The Brite manager noted that it was foolish for 
her to redeem 5,000 carry-over points for a mere $100 under the 
cash redemption provision of the contract when it would have 
considerably greater value when used to maintain the highest 
commission level for more than four months. When she realized the 
full import of her error, Cathy Palmer stated (Palmer p. 33, lines 
19-23): 
My gosh, 15,000 points I have cashed in for 
$300. That is one full year of retirement, 
one full year of retirement, of bonuses on my 
management, on my down-line organization which 
could have been worth 10-$15,000 to me. 
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The reference to fla full year of retirement" relates to the 
representations made by Brite owners and management during the 
years from 1982 to 1990 regarding the uses of the carry-over 
points. Ted Brady, the president and a founder of the Appellee 
corporation, had instructed the sales representatives of the 
company that they could use their carry-over points during periods 
of personal sales inactivity as a result of sickness (Brady p. 18, 
19) , pregnancy (Brady p. 18) or church missionary service (Brady p. 
19). 
Although Mr. Brady failed to acknowledge that he had also said 
that the carry-over points could be used for retirement (Brady p. 
18, lines 14-18), Mr. Vassel, the executive vice president of 
Brite, said that he had explained the marketing program to groups 
of 50 to 200 sales representatives at a time in sales meetings 
throughout the United States. In these meetings he and others had 
specifically taught that the carry-over points could be used for 
retirement (Vassel pp. 19-22). This fact was confirmed by other 
witnesses, including Cathy Palmer (Palmer p. 36). Both Cathy 
Palmer and Mr. Vassel testified that the use of carry-over points 
for retirement purposes was personally explained to them by Mr. 
Brady (Palmer p. 36, lines 18-25; Vassel p. 22, lines 9-13). 
Contrary to every notion ever presented to the sales 
representatives by Brite, its owners and its executive officers, 
both past and present (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-12), if Brite could 
exercise the right to redeem the carry-over points, the whole 
concept of pregnancy leave, sick leave, missionary finances and 
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retirement would be a virtual nullity. For the sum of $300 Brite 
could gobble up an entire year of retirement, and for one or two 
thousand dollars Brite could destroy a decade or a lifetime of 
work. In Cathy Palmer's case, Brite sought to eliminate 39 months 
of carry-over points at the highest compensation level (1,200 
points a month) for only $900 (Palmer pp. 85-86). These were the 
points accumulated by arguably Brite's most recognized sales person 
over an eight year period of intensive work. 
Beginning as early as 1987, Weaver and Palmer began to use 
their carry-over points in the manner for which they were actually 
intended, that is; to maintain the highest point and compensation 
level, while devoting less time to personal sales activity (Palmer 
p. 84, lines 12-24). This was a well recognized practice for the 
years 1987 through 1990. Brite honored the proper use of carry-
over points for Palmer in the amount of 27,070.33 points (Palmer p. 
73, pp. 84-85). Over a four year period beginning in 1986, Brite 
honored the proper use of carry-over points by Weaver in the amount 
of 34,268.09 points (Trial Exhibit P-57 and Exhibit B attached 
hereto). 
Beginning in 1982, with the adoption of the carry-over point 
component of the Program, until the end of 1990, the parties 
established a clear course of dealing between Brite and its sales 
representatives with regard to the meaning of the cited contractual 
provision. During this eight year period of time, only sales 
representatives exercised the redemption provision for cash (Palmer 
p. 86, p. 90, lines 2-3; Brady p. 58; lines 14-18). Those points 
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that were not redeemed for cash, at the election of the sales 
representatives, were used to maintain the point and compensation 
level which offered the sales representative the highest monthly 
remuneration. 
Ted Brady, the principal executive and one of the two 
principal founders of Brite, explained the marketing program to 
Weaver and Palmer. He was also present when other executive 
employees of Brite were both trained and then conducted seminars to 
recruit and encourage new sales representatives (Vassel p. 22) . 
Each training session and each promotional seminar was devoid of 
any reference to the notion that Brite also had a right to exercise 
the cash redemption provision of the sales representative contract 
(Brady p, 29, lines 17-20; Vassel p. 39; Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15). 
Weaver and Palmer, as two of the most successful sales 
representatives in the history of the company, were engaged 
extensively in the recruitment process and were major presenters at 
promotional seminars (Palmer p. 59, lines 23-25). Brite portrayed 
Julie Weaver as the archetypical successful sales representative 
and made a recruiting video featuring her (Vassel p. 20). Weaver 
and Palmer also sat on the executive board of Brite (Palmer p. 39, 
line 9). Their only instruction, throughout this entire period of 
eight years, was that it was solely the right of the sales 
representative to accumulate and use the carry-over points, or 
exercise the cash redemption provision. 
At the end of calendar year 1990, ostensibly for reasons of a 
downturn in the business of Brite, Mr. Brady announced that Brite 
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was going to redeem all outstanding carry-over points at the rate 
of $100 for each 5,000 points accumulated. Not only was the carry-
over point component eliminated for the period after the announced 
program change, but the carry-over points were eliminated 
retroactively (Palmer p. 74, lined 18-25). 
Brite tendered checks to the sales representatives, asserting 
that Brite had the right to exercise the carry-over point 
redemption provision. This announcement by the president of the 
corporation was the first time that anyone had ever asserted that 
Brite had the right to exercise the cash redemption provision. The 
draconian elimination of all accumulated carry-over points, and the 
elimination of the carry-over point concept entirely from the 
Program, shocked the entire independent sales representative 
network of the company, caused substantial monetary damages to 
Weaver and Palmer, and essentially destroyed the independent 
representative marketing structure of the company (Palmer p. 103) . 
There was no testimony given at the time of the trial that (a) 
Brite had the right to redeem the carry-over points, or (b) that 
both the sales representatives and Brite had the right to redeem 
the carry-over points. Appellee relied solely on the argument of 
counsel and the legal construction of the carry-over point 
provision of the contract, as a matter of law, without any other 
factual support. 
Although Brite was the sole scrivener of the document 
(Brady p. 10, lines 8-16), the trial court found "that the 
foregoing marketing program language is unambiguous and that the 
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use of the term "However" at the beginning of the second sentence 
thereof acts as a qualification to the accumulation provision 
contained in the first sentence. Thus, the ability of the 
plaintiffs [Weaver and Palmer] to continue accumulating carry-over 
points indefinitely is limited by the redemption wording in the 
second sentence" (see paragraph 2 of the January 27, 1995 Final 
Order of Dismissal; Exhibit D attached). 
Upon a motion for directed verdict at the end of the 
Appellants' case, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that 
Brite also had the right to exercise the cash redemption provision 
of the cited contractual language. 
Summary of Arguments 
1. On appeal from a directed verdict, the Appeals Court must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Appellants. 
If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in 
favor of the Appellants, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
2. It is fundamental that doubtful language in the contract 
should be interpreted against Brite, who was the party that 
selected the language and drafted the document. 
3. If the interpretation of the doubtful language of a 
contract is to be determined as a matter of law by the words in the 
agreement, a cardinal rule in construing such a contract is to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties. Such contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its 
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terms
 # and all of its terms should be given effect if it is 
possible. 
4. The doubtful language of the contract between the parties 
is ambiguous. The factual issues presented by the parol evidence 
admitted in this matter must be submitted to the jury and not 
determined as a matter of law. 
5. The doubtful language of the contract between the parties 
is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the eight year 
course of dealing between the parties. This course of dealing 
establishes the fact that only the Appellant sales representatives 
had the right to exercise the carry-over redemption provision of 
the contract. Such factual matters are to be presented to the jury 
and not determined as a matter of law. 
6. Brite has waived its right to claim, and is now estopped 
from asserting, that it also has a right to exercise the carryover 
point redemption provision. 
Argument 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT TO 
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT BOTH THE 
APPELLANTS AND THE APPELLEE HAD THE RIGHT TO 
EXERCISE THE CASH REDEMPTION PROVISION OR 
WHETHER THE REDEMPTION RIGHT WAS SOLELY THAT 
OF THE APPELLANTS. 
The basis of the trial court's granting of Brite's motion for 
a directed verdict is the court's determination that Brite had the 
right to redeem the carry-over points of the Appellants, Weaver and 
Palmer. If Brite did not have this right, and only the sales 
representatives of Brite could exercise the redemption right, the 
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trial court's judgment would be in error. If a question of 
material fact exists as to which party to the contract had the 
right to exercise the redemption provision, a directed verdict 
cannot be sustained and that material fact must be submitted to the 
jury for determination. 
On an appeal from a directed verdict, the Appellate Court 
should give no deference to the factual findings or legal 
conclusions of the trial court, but should review the facts and 
apply the proper legal standard de novo. Canfield v. Albertsons, 
841 p. 2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992). 
In this Court's recent decision of Klienert v. Kimball 
Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah adv. Rep. 44, (Ut. App. 
10/19/95), this Court held that: 
On appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must 
examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained.' Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural 
Educ. Rec. Ass'n., 845 p.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P. 2d at 
898). Where there is any evidence that raises 
a question of material fact, no matter how 
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment 
as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P. 2d 241, 246 
(Utah 1992). emphasis added 
In the evidence presented at trial on the question of who had 
the right to exercise the redemption provision, it was not only 
probable that only the sales representatives had the right, the 
evidence was nearly compelling that such was the case. In her 
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testimony at the time of the trial, Cathy Palmer testified as 
follows (Palmer p. 87, lines 9-15): 
Q And all the time that you were with Brite, was there 
any— did they every tell you that Brite could redeem 
those points, or was it your option? 
A Not at any time. Not at any times. It states 
clearly in the printed material that that was your [i.e. 
the sales representative's] option. You could redeem 
them from Brite. Not by Brite. From Brite. 
emphasis added 
This testimony of Catherine Palmer, alone, is sufficient to 
justify submitting to the jury in this case the question of whether 
Brite also had the right to exercise the redemption clause or 
whether the redemption provision option was solely the right of the 
sales representatives. 
Palmer testified elsewhere that she was told by management 
representatives of the Company that the redemption option was hers 
(Palmer p. 33) . Bruno Vassel, hired as the executive vice 
president of Brite and trained by its president, Ted Brady, stated 
that the option was obviously that of the sales representative 
(Vassel p. 39) . Most compelling, however, is the fact that the 
record of the trial proceedings fails to include a single statement 
by any witness asserting that Brite also had the right to exercise 
the redemption provision. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the Appellants called 
Mr. Brady as an adverse witness to ask him this very question. 
Further, the same question had been asked of Mr. Brady at the time 
of his deposition and the opportunity for him to provide 
contradicting testimony was afforded to him. 
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At the trial, Appellants' counsel asked Mr. Brady to read from 
his deposition and answer the question again. The trial transcript 
records as follows (Brady p. 29, lines 15-20): 
A Let's see, your question? 
Q Yes 
A 'I want you to think about it again. You don't have 
any recollection about that being discussed, whose 
options (sic) it was.' 
I said 'no'. 
The immediate subsequent question of Appellants' counsel 
afforded Mr. Brady a third opportunity to declare that it was also 
the right of Brite Music to redeem the carry-over points. In 
referring to the redemption language in the contract, Appellants' 
counsel asked": 
Q Now, if in drafting these terms that you've 
indicated so far, Mr. Brady, if Brite Music could redeem 
at will for $100, wouldn't that be incon — if the right 
was in Brite to redeem for $100 wouldn't that be 
inconsistent with the term 'as long as you desire?' 
Wouldn't that be inconsistent? 
A I'm not sure I can answer that (Brady p. 29, lines 
21-25, p. 30, lines 1-2). 
Having squarely placed this issue within the scope of cross-
examination in presenting Appellants' case in chief, Brite's 
counsel did not elicit any testimony from Mr. Brady that either Mr. 
Brady or anyone on behalf of Brite had said, implied or intimated 
that Brite also had the right to exercise the redemption option. 
Based upon the testimony in this case, and the clear legal 
authority affirmed by this Court, the trial court erred in failing 
to submit to the jury the factual issue of whether or not Brite 
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also had the right to exercise the carry-over point redemption 
option. 
Reasonable individuals could differ in their conclusions 
regarding these matters which should not be determined as a matter 
of law by the trial court, A directed verdict is tantamount to 
granting a motion for a nonsuit. On appeal it must be reversed, if 
the evidence is such that reasonable individuals could arrive at a 
different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dainsie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 
428 (1970). 
POINT II 
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES 
CONTRACT MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST BRITE, THE 
SOLE SCRIVENER OF THE DOCUMENT. 
The first principle in the construction of a contract is 
provided for in 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, §348, which states as 
follows: 
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a 
contract should be interpreted most strongly 
against the party who has selected that 
language, especially where he seeks to use such 
language to defeat the contract or its 
operation, unless the use of such language in 
the contract is prescribed by law. Also, in 
case of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be 
construed most strongly against the party who 
drew or prepared it, or supplied a form for the 
agreement, or whose attorney drew or prepared 
it. 
In the case of Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P. 2d 254, 257 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court affirmed the basic law in Am Jur. that 
doubtful terms in a contract should be interpreted against the 
party who has chosen such terms. 
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In the case of Wincrets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 
1007, (Utah 1972), the Supreme Court also affirmed the basic 
proposition that a contract must be strictly construed against 
whoever drafts the contract. 
The testimony identifying the party who drafted the sales 
representative contract is unequivocal. Brite was the sole 
scrivener. The president of Brite testified (Brady p. 10, lines 8-
16) : 
Q Thank you. Are the words and the language and the 
terms your language? The language of Brite Music? 
A The language of Brite Music, yeah. 
Q And it was drafted and the language you chose was 
the language of you and Mr. Perry?3 
A Correct. 
Q These two ladies [the Appellants] had nothing to do 
with choosing the language or the program, did they? 
A I think they did not. 
As the sole author of the sales representative contract, and 
its terms providing for the redemption of carry-over points, the 
provision is to be construed against the interpretation urged by 
Brite. 
3
 Mike Perry was the vice-president of Brite or the first 
executive officer of the company under Mr. Brady in 1982 when the 
carryover points concept was drafted into the sales representative 
agreement (Palmer p. 31, lines 16-24). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
INTERPRET THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF 
THE SALES CONTRACT SO AS TO HARMONIZE ALL OF 
THE TERMS OF THE PROVISION. 
A second significant principle of construction is that a 
contract is to be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms 
and provisions, and all of its terms and provisions should be given 
effect, if possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). In the Buehner Block case, the Utah Supreme 
Court re-emphasized certain basic principles of the construction of 
contractual provisions. At page 895 of its opinion, the Court 
states: 
The interpretation of a written contract may 
be a question of law determined by the words 
in the agreement. In this regard, a cardinal 
rule in construing such a contract is to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties, and 
if possible, these intentions should be 
gleaned from an examination of the text of the 
contract itself. Additionally, it is 
axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its 
provisions and all of its terms, and all of 
its terms should be given effect if it is 
possible to do so. 
In light of these principles, we are to examine what the trial 
court did in this matter. In the second numbered paragraph of the 
Final Order of Dismissal (Exhibit D attached hereto), the trial 
court found that the language of the sales representative contract 
was unambiguous. It therefore appears that it was the position of 
the trial court that it could determine the interpretation of the 
contract provision by the words of the agreement only. 
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The matter of the existence of ambiguity in the contract 
provision is addressed in Point IV below. For purposes of argument 
in this portion of Appellants' Brief however, let us consider that 
the provision is unambiguous. In such event, the cardinal 
principles of contract interpretation referenced above in the 
Buehner Block case still apply. 
Further, the standard of review in such a case is also stated 
clearly by the Court in Buehner Block at page 895: 
If a trail court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, as was obviously the case here, 
we accord its construction no particular 
weight and review its actions under a 
correction-of-error standard. 
Inviting the Appeal Court's attention to the language to be 
construed (the "Subject Paragraph"), Appellants quote the relevant 
language from paragraph one of the referenced Final Order of 
Dismissal: 
As you continue to exceed 1200 points per 
month, the increasing carry-over points may 
accumulate for as long as you desire. 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable for a check from Brite 
for $100. Redeeming points in this manner 
does not affect your life-time point 
accumulation or the benefits you may 
eventually derive therefrom, (emphasis added 
by Appellants) 
Careful analysis of this contract provision is aided by 
considering each of the components of the paragraph and the parties 
referred to in the paragraph. This contract is between Brite Music 
Enterprises on the one hand and the sales representative on the 
other. The company is referred to once in the subject paragraph as 
"Brite". The sales representative is referred to several times 
throughout the agreement by the use of the pronouns "you" or 
"your11. 
The three separate segments or components of the paragraph may 
be analyzed as follows. The first sentence of the paragraph (the 
"First Componentff) refers to the right to accumulate carry-over 
points. The Second Component of the paragraph is contained in the 
second sentence and relates to a right to redeem 5,000 carry-over 
points for the sum of $100. The Third Component for analysis is 
the third and final sentence of the paragraph which refers to a 
"life-time point accumulation". 
Although the key component for purposes of this appeal is the 
Second Component consisting of the second sentence, the Buehner 
Block case states that we must harmonize the provisions of the 
entire paragraph. Special consideration should be given to the 
Second Component of the paragraph regarding the redemption rights. 
The language of this component is as follows: 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable for a check from Brite 
for $100." 
The central issue of this appeal is resolved by answering the 
question; "Who has the right to exercise the redemption provision?" 
For purposes of analysis and construction of the Second Component, 
Appellants state that there are only three possible interpretations 
of the phrase. These three possibilities are listed below. The 
underlined language has been added by the Appellants to facilitate 
the analysis of the phrase. 
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FIRST POSSIBILITY 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable by you for a check from 
Brite for $100; 
OR 
SECOND POSSIBILITY 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable by you or bv Brite for a 
check from Brite for $100; 
OR 
THIRD POSSIBILITY 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable by Brite for a check from 
Brite for $100. 
For purposes of argument, and in light of the fact that there 
are only two parties to the agreement, the foregoing phrases are 
the only logical possibilities which may be considered. The Third 
Possibility can, in all likelihood, be eliminated. No one has 
asserted this position, either in testimony at the time of the 
trial, or in argument on Brite's motion for directed verdict. 
Further, the matter of the course of dealing between the parties 
and the admissions of the president of Brite, as addressed in Point 
V below, should eliminate this possibility. However, if analyzed 
strictly as a logical argument based on construction only, the 
Third Possibility would be considered one of only three 
constructions which could be accepted by this Court. 
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Because the Second Possibility is the position asserted by 
Brite in its motion for directed verdict and because the First 
Possibility is the position asserted by the Appellants in response 
to Brite's motion for directed verdict and in this appeal, 
Appellants' analysis will focus on the first two alternatives to 
the Second Component of the Subject Paragraph. 
If this Court should determine that the Subject Paragraph is 
unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze the Subject 
Paragraph and the language of the Second Component thereof in light 
of the principles enunciated in the Abbott case discussed in Point 
II of this Brief and according to the principles enunciated in the 
Buehner Block case cited above. 
If the Appeals Court believes that the First Possibility is 
the correct interpretation, then the trial court erred and this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that 
only Weaver and Palmer are able to exercise the redemption 
provision, and the balance of the case relating to the breach of 
the contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants 
should be submitted to the jury. 
In the event that the Appeals Court determines that the Second 
Possibility is the correct interpretation, then Brite also had the 
right to redeem the accumulated carry-over points; its actions in 
tendering checks to the Appellants to purchase their carry-over 
points was sanctioned by the agreement between the parties and the 
ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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If# however, the Appeals Court should determine that the 
Subject Paragraph and the Second Component thereof are ambiguous, 
then this matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
submission to a jury with proper instructions on the construction 
of the Subject Paragraph as set forth in Points I through VI of 
this Brief. In such event, the jury should rightfully determine 
this matter which cannot properly be resolved as a matter of law by 
the trial court. 
Continuing with a strictly legal construction of the First and 
Second Possibilities, the Appeal Court's objective is to determine 
the persons or entities entitled to exercise the redemption right 
consistent with the principles of Abbott and Buehner Block. To 
harmonize the provisions of this section, it is first important to 
notice that the pronoun you is the antecedent to each bestowed of 
a right. The Subject Paragraph provides: "you continue to 
exceed..." regarding the accumulation of points. The paragraph 
states that this may be done as long as "you desire". The 
redemption does not "affect your life-time point accumulation", and 
the paragraph concludes with the reference to "benefits you may 
eventually derive...". The only reference to Brite relates not to 
a benefit or a right, but relates to an obligation of Brite to pay 
for the cash redemption price for the points, if redeemed. In 
reading the paragraph as a whole, and in harmonizing its various 
parts, one must conclude that the antecedent for the redemption 
right is also "you". the sales representative. 
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Although the logical consistency of this argument is apparent, 
the inverse analysis of the paragraph is more compelling. There is 
absolutely no basis in the language of the paragraph which would 
indicate that Brite is the one that had the right to redeem the 
carry-over points• The Second Possibility, which is the position 
urged by Brite, is as follows: 
However, each increment of 5,000 points is 
redeemable by you or by Brite for a check from 
Brite for $100. 
There is nothing in the balance of the paragraph which can support 
the notion of inserting the language by Brite into the Second 
Component of the paragraph. 
The second analysis for harmonizing the ideas expressed in the 
Subject Paragraph comes from focusing on the first two sentences as 
a whole. The concept that Brite had the right to exercise the 
redemption provision is inconsistent with the phrase contained in 
the first sentence of the paragraph that says that the sales 
representative may accumulate the carry-over points "for as long as 
you [the sales representative] desire". In construing the 
paragraph, particularly in construing it against the scrivener of 
the paragraph, we cannot give effect to the desires of the sales 
representative if Brite can unilaterally take away the carry-over 
points. 
The third analysis for harmonizing the provisions of the 
Subject Paragraph is in harmonizing the concepts of the paragraph 
with the contract as a whole and the intended uses of the carry-
over points. As indicated in greater detail at pages 14 and 15 in 
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the factual summary, the carry-over points were to be used to 
maintain the highest point level of compensation during periods of 
personal sales inactivity. This included times of sickness (Brady, 
p. 18, 19), pregnancy (Brady, p. 18), church missionary service 
(Brady p. 19) and retirement (Vassel pp. 19-22 and Palmer p. 36). 
If Brite could exercise the right to redeem the carry-over 
points, the whole concept of pregnancy leave, sick leave, 
missionary finances and retirement would be illusory. For the sum 
of $300, Brite could eliminate an entire year of retirement or 
missionary service. In Cathy Palmer's case, Brite wrongfully 
sought to eliminate 39 months of carry-over points for only $900 
(Palmer p. 85-86). On a conservative basis Palmer testified that, 
when used as provided in her sales representative contract, these 
carry-over points had a value in excess of 31,000 (Palmer p. 85, 
line 22). 
To accord the trial court's determination as a matter of law 
the fullest possible scope, we must consider the misplaced reliance 
that the trial court bestowed upon the word "however" that joins 
the First and Second Components of the Subject Paragraph. In the 
second paragraph of the Final Order of Dismissal (Exhibit D 
attached hereto), the trial court states that: "the term 'However' 
at the beginning of the second sentence thereof acts as a 
qualification to the accumulation provision contained in the first 
sentence. Thus, the ability of plaintiffs to continue accumulating 
carry-over points is limited by the redemption wording in the 
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second sentence" [i.e. the Second Component]. 
This analysis is not dispositive of the question at issue here 
for at least two significant reasons. To designate the word 
"however" as a word of "qualification" still does not answer the 
question as to who had the right to "qualify" the on-going 
accumulation of carry-over points. The First and Second Components 
of the Subject Paragraph provide that the points will accumulate 
unless they are redeemed. If the accumulation is qualified by the 
redemption, that qualification would properly be a function of the 
sales representative's election to redeem the carry-over points. 
If a sales representative elected to redeem some of her carry-over 
points, her right to use those points to maintain the highest 
compensation level would be qualified. This fact does not grant 
Brite the right to exercise the redemption option. 
Admitting for purposes of argument that the use of points for 
the highest compensation level would be "qualified" by the cash 
redemption of those points (thereby making them unavailable for use 
to maintain the highest compensation level), Appellants assert that 
this characterization of the word "however" does not answer the 
question of who had the right to trigger the qualification of the 
accumulation of carry-over points by the cash redemption. 
For example, Possibility One and Possibility Two, as 
referenced above, both contain the word "however". If "however" is 
treated as a word of "qualification", it may be said that in both 
instances the ability to continually accumulate carry-over points 
is qualified by the cash redemption provision of the Second 
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Component of the Subject Paragraph. In the First Possibility, only 
the sales representative can exercise the cash redemption 
provision. In the Second Possibility, both the sales 
representative and Brite can exercise the cash redemption 
provision. In neither instance does the word "however" assist in 
the analysis of determining of who has the right to exercise the 
cash redemption provision. 
The second basis for Appellants' objection to the trial 
court's undue emphasis on the word "however" is that the Appellants 
disagree with the assertion that the word "however" is a word of 
qualification. As presented in the motion of Weaver and Palmer for 
a new trial and their motion to set aside the verdict, the 
Appellants respectfully disagreed with the trial court regarding 
the import of the term "however". In the memorandum supporting 
their motion, Appellants provided the Webster's Dictionary 
explanation of the word (R. 732) . This treatment is instructive on 
appeal. Websters New Collegiate Dictionary 1973 Ed., defines the 
word "however" not as a word of limitation, but as a conjunction. 
"Conjunction," implies the joining of alternatives or other 
courses. 
Reading the First and Second Components of the Subject 
Paragraph together, Appellants submit that a sales representative 
had the right to accumulate the carry-over points for as long as 
she desired, or, in the alternative or as a second course of 
action, she could give up those points and receive a cash 
redemption price. These alternatives, or different courses of 
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action, are at the election of the sale representative. 
Construing the Subject Paragraph as a whole, and such 
paragraph together with the entire sales representative agreement, 
Appellants respectfully submit that only the sales representative 
had the right to exercise the cash redemption provision. 
Construing the paragraph as a whole, and harmonizing its various 
parts, the First Possibility is the only proper interpretation of 
the Subject Paragraph. 
POINT IV 
THE FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE ADMISSIONS 
OF PAROL EVIDENCE REGARDING ANY AMBIGUITY IN 
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES 
CONTRACT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND 
NOT DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Point III of the Appellants Brief addresses the strict legal 
construction of Subject Paragraph relating to whose right it is to 
exercise the carry-over point redemption. This analysis was 
undertaken by reason of the trial court's conclusion that the 
language of the Subject Paragraph was "unambiguous" (Final Order of 
Dismissal, paragraph 2; Exhibit D attached hereto). Prior to 
making this determination at the conclusion of the case in chief of 
Palmer and Weaver, the trial court had admitted a plethora of parol 
evidence. This testimony was admitted without objection of Brite's 
counsel, and even with such counsel's full participation (See cross 
examination of Vassel and Palmer at Vassel p. 52, lines 1-14; p. 
53, lines 12-24; Palmer p. 104, lines 1-7). 
In footnote 11 on page 895 of the case of Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
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Court addresses the proper manner of proceeding in a case regarding 
the construction of a contractual provision. The Supreme Court 
stated that a trial court should first determine whether an 
ambiguity exists and then having determined the existence of an 
ambiguity, admit parol evidence. The footnote provides: 
[W]hether ambiguity exists is question of law 
to be decided by trail court before parol 
evidence admitted; Morris, 658 P.2d at 1201; 
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 
691 (Utah 1977) f,[T]he court should first 
examine the language of the instruments and 
accord to it the weight and effect which it 
may show was intended and if the meaning is 
ambiguous or uncertain then consider parol 
evidence of the parties' intentions." 
(footnote omitted.). 
Nevertheless, the matter of the ambiguity of the Subject 
Paragraph was addressed to the trial court (R. 726 Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for a New Trial and Motion to Set Aside Verdict; 
and Transcript of Motion for Directed Verdict p. 31) , and this 
issue is presented on appeal. Appellants will therefore first 
address the existence of an ambiguity in the Subject Paragraph and 
secondly consider the parol evidence admitted at trial. 
Admitting the parol evidence to aid construction of the 
Subject Paragraph and afterwards concluding that the provision was 
unambiguous is error by the trial court. However, neither 
Appellants or Appellee objected to such procedure in the trial 
court. 
A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are "insufficient 
in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
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plausible meanings." Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins, Co, v. 
Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), quoting Central 
Sec, Mut. Ins, Co, v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 681 P.2d 15, 17 
(1984). 
Because the existence of ambiguity is a question of law, the 
Appeals Court is to accord no particular weight to the trial 
court's interpretation and the matter is to be reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard (Buehner Block supra p. 895) . 
Appellants submit that any possibility of ambiguity could 
have been eliminated by Brite, the scrivener of the Subject 
Paragraph, if it had expressly stated the antecedent to the words 
"is redeemable" in the Second Component of the Subject Paragraph. 
Brite failed to do so. This leaves for de novo consideration by 
this Appeals Court whether the First, Second or Third Possibility 
listed on page 28 of this Brief is the proper construction of the 
Subject Paragraph. 
Because the antecedent to the two verbs prior to the 
redemption provision in the Subject Paragraph is the pronoun "you" 
(i.e. "you continue to exceed" and "...you desire"), it would be 
appropriate as a matter of law for this Court to determine that 
"you" [the sales representative] is the antecedent to the next verb 
in the Subject Paragraph (i.e. "is redeemable"). The Appeals Court 
could therefore determine, as a matter of law, that the redemption 
right is exclusively that of the sales representative. 
If the Appeals Court is unable to make such determination as 
a matter of construction and as a matter of law, the Appellants 
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submit that the Second Component is, in fact, ambiguous and that 
the selection among the three possibilities of proper construction 
of this paragraph must be aided by consideration of the parol 
evidence admitted at the trial. Further, the existence of this 
ambiguity would necessitate the consideration of the course of 
dealing between the parties as addressed in Point V below. 
With regard to the potential ambiguity in the Subject 
Paragraph, Mr. Vassel's testimony on cross-examination by Brite's 
counsel is instructive (Vassel p. 51, lines 25 and p. 52, lines 1-
19). 
Q I want to clarify that we are not talking about 
accumulating points here. We are talking about redeeming 
those points? 
A Okay. 
Q Clearly, and I have no problem with the fact that a 
marketing associate can elect to redeem if they choose 
to, right? 
A Right. 
Q Is there anything in this that says that the company 
cannot redeem also? 
A Doesn't say either way. 
Q Right. Just says thev [the carry-over points") can 
be redeemed, doesn't it? 
A This is written to the representatives or 
distributors? 
Q I appreciate that but there's nothing that says the 
company can't redeem, is there? 
A No, and I think it would be out of context if there 
was because this is written to the distributors about 
what they can so. (emphasis added) 
By Mr. Vassel's testimony and the statement of Brite's 
38 
counsel, the redemption language of the Subject Paragraph "doesn't 
state either way11 whether Brite had the right to redeem the carry-
over points. Yet, on its analysis of the language the trial court 
ruled as a matter of law that Brite did possess such right. 
Appellants submit that, if the language of the Subject Paragraph 
does not state either way whether Brite may redeem the carry-over 
points, then the language is ambiguous as to such right. In that 
event, parol evidence and the course of dealing of the parties is 
essential, and all of these factual issues are to be submitted to 
the jury for determination. 
On the issue of parol evidence, Appellants direct the 
attention of the Court to the testimony of Palmer at page 86, lines 
Q And all the time that you were with Brite, was there 
any— did they every tell you that Brite could redeem 
those points, or was it your option? 
A Not at any time. Not at any times. It states 
clearly in the printed material that that was your [i.e. 
the sales representative's] option. You could redeem 
them from Brite. Not by Brite. From Brite. 
(emphasis added) 
Palmer further discussed Mr. Brady's instructions to her as 
follows (Palmer p. 36, lines 18-25 and p. 37, lines 1-8): 
A . . . And I asked Ted specifically, I said, "Ted, 
now you need to make sure this is absolutely clear in my 
mind, because I'm telling my new prospects, my new 
distributors this. I want to make sure that I'm telling 
them accurately that they can build up carry-over points, 
as many and as long as they want to for any reason that 
they deem necessary, be it retirement," and there was 
never any age spoken of for retirement. Just retirement, 
sickness, illness, a family tragedy, vacation, anything 
you wanted to do. 
And Ted said, "Absolutely. That's the flexibility 
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and the benefit of the point system and the carry-over 
points.11 
Q. Did he indicate at that time whether you could carry 
them over indefinitely? 
A. Absolutely. 
See also Palmer's testimony at page 39, lines 2-12: 
Q. Do you recall on other occasions at that time in 
management meetings when this question came up on the 
issue of allowing a person to use their carry-over 
points? 
A. I don't recall a single managers' meeting that at 
lease some of us didn't discuss carry-over points, 
retirement, the benefit. It was a huge issue. It was a 
very important issue to us as what we called, and the 
company called — referred to us as career executives. 
We weren't part-timers. We were in this serious. We 
were building for our future. There was a career for us, 
not just a part-time job. 
It is not the Appeals Court's purpose here to make a finding 
of fact based upon the parol evidence cited here or elsewhere in 
this Brief. The objective here is to determine if, in fact, there 
were factual issues that should have been submitted to the jury. 
In this regard, reference is again made to Kleinert v. Kimball 
Elevator Company supra. At page two of its opinion, this Court 
stated that: 
Where there is any evidence that raises a 
question of material fact, no matter how 
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment 
as a matter of law is improper. 
In further analysis of the parol evidence presented at trial, 
is the substantial testimony regarding the fact that the cash 
redemption price was significantly less than the amount that could 
be earned by the representative through the use of the carry-over 
40 
points to maintain the highest level of compensation (e.g. Palmer 
p. 33 lines 19-23). This testimony makes the notion that Brite 
also had the right to redeem carry-over points wholly inconsistent 
with the stated purposes for the carry-over points. This 
inconsistency demonstrates that these material factual issues are 
to be submitted to the jury for determination, and not decided as 
a matter of law. 
In this regard, the attention of the Appeal Court is directed 
to the testimony of Bruno Vassel, the former executive vice-
president of Brite. Mr. Vassel had been a senior executive at Avon 
products where he was responsible for Human Resources in 22 
countries and subsequently responsible for world-wide training for 
a million and a half Avon sales representatives (Vassel pp. 5-6). 
In questioning regarding the carry-over point aspect of the 
marketing program, Mr. Vassel testified: 
A I was aware of a provision where if a distributor 
wanted to redeem or turn in their points they would get 
some money for those points. I was also aware of the 
fact that it was so ludicrously little that nobody hardly 
ever did it. 
Q I see. Did you ever tell the people in - the 
representatives who's right it was to redeem, whether it 
was the company's right or the representatives' right? 
A No, that never came up because it wasn't an issue. 
It was obvious. , 
Q Define the term obvious. 
A Well, it was obvious that the distributor had the 
right to use their points whenever they wanted to, or not 
use them whenever they wanted to. 
Note that Mr. Vassel testified that it was the right of the 
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sales representative to exercise the redemption provision and that 
no one would do so because it was "ludicrously little". Clearly 
the amount to be paid was too small to satisfy the benefits of the 
carry-over points as taught by Mr. Vassel in his national training 
meetings for Brite. In these meetings, he referred to the 
accumulation of carry-over points as storing them in a "special 
box". He described his presentation to the sales representatives 
as follows, (Vassel pp. 21-22, beginning at line 4): 
A So I'd say, 'Here's where the company is so 
wonderful. It's as if you have a little box over here 
you take those other 800 [points] and you put it in your 
special box to be used at some point in the future.' And 
then I said, 'Now, in times of sickness or if you're a 
woman and you are pregnant and you want to take six 
months or a year off, or people — for example, LDS men 
and many — most of the people were LDS in the 
organization; not all. I would say, 'If you want to go 
on a mission, for the LDS church,' I said, 'There's 
examples of people in the company, distributors who have 
taken six month off, or who have had a baby, or who have 
gone on a mission, and have been able to dip into this 
box of carry-over points that they have developed over 
time, and they have been able to take those points and 
use them, 1,200 per month to permit them to continue to 
get those down-line commissions even thought they weren't 
working right then. 
They had earned it in the past. And so I said to 
people, look, this is a form of developing for a 
retirement in the future. And I told them, 'We have 
examples of people who hit an age where they want to 
retire, and for the next several years some of them have 
earned enough points and the company has agreed to keep 
those in that little box, if you will, so that then those 
people on retirement, or whatever, could use those. And 
we have examples in the company of people over the next 
several years who have used that.' 
Q Was this the very same thing that Ted taught you in 
reference to the program? 
A Well, I didn't know it before I got — Ted taught 
me. Mary Lou, his marketing person, taught me, and the 
sales plan taught me. 
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Appellants submit that all of the foregoing testimony was 
heard by the jury in this case and that factual issues raised by 
the ambiguity should have properly been submitted to the jury for 
its determination. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET 
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES 
CONTRACT IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE EIGHT 
YEAR COURSE OF DEALING OF THE PARTIES. 
To further aid in the construction of the Subject Paragraph, 
there is available to this Court the testimony regarding the course 
of dealing between the sales representative and Brite regarding the 
redemption and use of the carry-over points. This point was 
stressed to the trial court at the time of the argument on the 
motion for directed verdict (Transcript of Motion for Directed 
Verdict p. 21). 
The Utah courts have adopted the general proposition that the 
course of dealing of the parties is to be used in establishing the 
proper construction of an agreement. Power Systems and Control v. 
Keith's Electric, 756 P.2d 5, (Ut. App. 1988) and Hecter, Inc. v. 
United Sav &. Loan Ass., 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Beginning in 1982, with the adoption of the carry-over point 
component of the Program, until the end of 1990, the parties 
established a clear course of dealing between Brite and its sales 
representatives with regard to the meaning of the cited contractual 
provision. During this eight year period of time, only sales 
representatives exercised the redemption provision for cash (Palmer 
p. 86, p. 90, lines 2-3; Brady p. 58; lines 14-18). Those points 
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not redeemed for cash, at the election of the sales 
representatives, were used to maintain the point and compensation 
level which offered the sales representative the highest monthly 
remuneration. 
Ted Brady, the principal executive and one of the two 
principal founders of Brite, explained the marketing program to 
Weaver and Palmer, and was present when other executive employees 
of Brite were both trained and then conducted seminars to recruit 
and encourage new sales representatives (Vassel p. 22). Each 
training session and each promotional seminar was devoid of any 
reference to the notion that Brite also had a right to exercise the 
cash redemption provision of the sales representative contract 
(Brady p. 29, lines 17-20; Vassel p. 39; Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15). 
Beginning as early as 1987, Weaver and Palmer began to use 
their carry-over points in the manner for which they were actually 
intended, that is; to maintain the highest point and compensation 
level, while devoting less time to personal sales activity (Palmer 
p. 84, lines 12-24). This was a well recognized practice for the 
years 1987 through 1990. Brite honored the proper use of carry-
over points for Palmer in the amount of 27,070.33 points (Palmer p. 
73, pp. 84-85; Trial Exhibit P-29 and Exhibit A attached hereto). 
Over a four year period beginning in 1986, Brite honored the proper 
use of carry-over points by Weaver in the amount of 34,268.09 
points (Trial Exhibit P-58 and Exhibit B attached hereto). 
The eight year course of dealing, and the admissions of Brite 
regarding such course of dealing, establish that it was the sole 
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right of the Appellant sales representatives to exercise the carry-
over point redemption provision of the subject agreement. Such 
factual matters are properly to be submitted to a jury for 
determination and are not to be decided on a motion for directed 
verdict. 
POINT VI 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER PRECLUDE 
BRITE FROM NOW ASSERTING THAT IT ALSO HAS THE 
RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE REDEMPTION OPTION 
PROVISION OF THE SALES CONTRACT. 
At the time of the argument on the motion for directed 
verdict, Appellants' counsel urged the trial court to allow counsel 
to argue to the jury (at the conclusion of the case), the issues of 
waiver and estoppel (Transcript of Motion for Directed Verdict p. 
54). This issue was raised again in Appellants' post-trial motions 
R. 698). 
An individual is estopped to deny or repudiate his promise 
made to another when that individual should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promiseef and does 
in fact induce such action or forbearance. See Sugarhouse Finance 
Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). 
Based upon the representations and admissions of Brite's 
president and its other executive officers, Bruno Vassel and Mike 
Perry, Weaver and Palmer dedicated several years of their lives to 
accumulating carry-over points because they were told that they 
could do so for as long as they desired. The language of the 
Subject Paragraph further documents Brite's inducement regarding 
this matter of accumulating the carry-over points at the election 
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of the sales representatives. 
The testimony of the promises and representations of Mr. 
Brady, Mr. Vassel and Mr. Perry has been quoted previously in this 
Brief, and for purposes of brevity is not repeated here. 
The sales representatives were entitled to rely upon the 
assertion that the right to redeem points was the right of the 
sales representative. The following testimony of Mike Perry's 
statements to Palmer was quoted to the trial court in the 
Appellants' memoranda in support of their post-trial motions 
(R.770; Palmer p. 31,32). 
Q And calling your attention to redemption of points, 
if any in 1992, did you contact one Mike Perry in 
reference to redeeming some of your points? 
A In 1982. You said 1992. In 1982 I did in a way 
into a managers' meeting they had asked me to speak at a 
regular meeting for all the representatives, and I wanted 
a new dress. So I had so many carryover points. I asked 
Mike Perry, I said, 'I want to turn in 5,000 of my 
carryover points because I'd like a check for $100.' So 
when I left the managers' meeting he left me that check, 
and a couple of months latter — 
Q Now, can you give us the best time first — 
A That would have been probably September of 1982. 
Q Thank you. 
A So I think probably November of 1982 I still had a 
lot of carryover points, and I though this would be a 
great way to get $200 extra dollars for Christmas. And 
so on the way into a managers' meeting that month I told 
Mike Perry, I dais, 'this time I'd like to cash in 10,000 
of my carryover points. I'd like a check for $200.' 
He said, 'Fine.' Then after the meeting when I went 
out to his desk to pick up the check, he said, 'Cathy, I 
realize that this is your option to do this if you want.' 
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As to the importance of Brite's promises and Palmer's 
reliance, Palmer testified: (Palmer p. 39, lines 5-12). 
A I don't recall a single managers' meeting that at 
lease [sic] some of us didn't discuss carryover points, 
retirement, the benefit. It was a huge issue. It was a 
very important issue to us as what we called, and the 
company called — referred to us as career executives. 
We weren't part-timers. We were in this serious. We 
were building for our future. There was a career for us, 
not just a part-time job. 
Based upon their reliance upon the promises of Brite, the 
Appellants have the right to submit the matters of waiver and 
estoppel to a jury in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Weaver and Palmer submit that the trial court erred in not 
submitting to the jury the material issues regarding the 
construction of their sales representative contracts. When all of 
the terms of the subject agreement are construed in light of the 
evidence submitted in this case, and when construed against the 
scrivener of the document, this matter may not be determined as a 
matter of law. 
If the Appeals Court should determine that the Subject 
Paragraph and the Second Component thereof are ambiguous, then this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for submission to a 
jury with proper instructions on the construction of the Subject 
Paragraph in accordance with cases cited in this Brief. In such 
event, the jury should rightfully determine the factual issues 
bearing on the construction of the agreement of the parties. 
If this Court should determine, however, that the Subject 
Paragraph is unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze the 
47 
Subject Paragraph and the language of the Second Component thereof 
in light of the principles of contract construction enunciated in 
the cases discussed in this Brief. 
If the Appeals Court determines as a matter of law that only 
the sales representative can exercise the carry-over point 
redemption provision, then the trial court erred and this matter 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that only 
Weaver and Palmer are able to exercise the redemption provision. 
Then the balance of the case, relating to the breach of the 
contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants, 
should be submitted to the jury. p 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lr day of December, 1995. 
/BRUCE L. DIBB 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, 
DIBB & JACKSON 
48 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellants and attached Addendum to the counsel 
for the Appellee by placing true copies thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Rick J. Sutherland 
P.O. Box 770 
Park City, Utah 84060 
lk postage prepaid, this (ft^  day of December, 1995 
APPBRF.436 
49 
ADDENDUM 
50 
Exhibit A 
CATHY PALMER 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
T o t a l S a l e s 
(BV) 
1 2 8 , 2 7 5 . 6 1 
2 1 1 , 6 4 7 . 4 7 
2 8 2 , 4 3 6 . 9 5 
2 9 3 , 7 2 4 . 7 5 
2 0 5 , 8 3 3 . 2 3 
1 4 7 , 8 7 3 . 7 6 
1 1 1 , 6 6 4 . 5 5 2 
T o t a l o f 
M o n t h l y 
Bonus 
$ 1 3 , 9 1 4 . 4 5 
2 1 , 5 4 5 . 9 3 
2 3 , 6 7 6 . 4 2 
2 0 , 1 3 4 . 0 8 
1 4 , 3 5 3 . 9 2 
8 , 1 5 8 . 5 5 
5 , 3 2 4 . 0 5 2 
T o t a l o f 
Management 
Bonus 
6 , 4 8 6 . 1 7 
1 1 , 2 6 6 . 2 4 
1 5 , 2 7 5 . 4 6 
1 5 , 2 4 3 . 7 1 
1 3 , 0 4 6 . 5 6 
7 , 9 1 5 . 6 8 
5 , 3 2 4 . 1 0 2 
C a r r y Over 
P o i n t s 1 
( C u m u l a t i v e ) 
2 5 , 0 8 8 . 5 3 
4 9 , 1 6 2 . 8 3 
6 9 , 7 0 2 . 7 8 
7 9 , 0 9 9 . 6 8 
7 4 , 3 9 2 . 5 3 
6 2 , 5 3 3 . 4 0 
5 2 , 0 2 9 . 3 5 2 
C a r r y Over 
P o i n t s Used 
t o M a i n t a i n 
H i g h e s t Po in t 
L e v e l 
4 , 7 0 7 . 1 5 
1 1 , 8 5 9 . 1 3 
1 0 , 5 0 4 . 0 5 
T o t a l Carry Over P o i n t s Honored by B r i t e : 2 7 , 0 7 0 . 3 3 
Balance o f Carry Over P o i n t s 
a s o f February 1 , 1991: 
Minimum number of months remaining at 
h i g h e s t l e v e l o f compensation: 
Value o f t h e balance o f t h e Carry Over P o i n t s ; 
10,12QiJS 
?7, OA9-35' 
4 0 i i months 
$ 3 2 , 1 0 1 -
tbl3.436 
1
 Cumula t ive C a r r y Over P o i n t s a s of yea r e n d . 
No i n f o r m a t i o n f o r October , November and December of 1990 
i PLAINTIFF'S 
Exhibit B 
JULIE WEAVER 
T o t a l of 
T o t a l Sa l e s Monthly 
(BV) Bonus 
1983 $368,814.62 
1984 467,175.25 
1985 737,765.11 
1986 997,581.10 
1987 1,084,949.45 
1988 9 2 6 , 4 3 2 . 2 1 
1989 5 3 9 , 7 8 5 . 1 5 
1990 6 2 9 , 2 1 3 . 1 5 
$21,619.08 
28,850.36 
43,037.41 
52,383.84 
49,484.76 
37,147.73 
30,750.85 
25,672.50 
Total of 
Management 
Bonus 
$16,726.29 
20,982.28 
34,768.28 
48,260.10 
48,050.23 
35,620.41 
30,650.00 
25,598.42 
Carry Over 
Points1 
(Cumulative) 
8 , 7 0 0 . 6 3 
2 7 , 1 8 9 . 3 3 
4 7 , 3 4 9 . 4 8 
5 1 , 5 6 8 . 8 4 
4 7 , 7 1 0 . 3 4 
4 4 , 8 3 6 . 0 6 
3 1 , 1 5 9 . 3 0 
1 7 , 3 0 0 . 7 2 
C a r r y O v e r 
P o i n t s Used 
t o M a i n t a i n 
H ighes t Point 
L e v e l 
3 , 8 5 8 . 5 0 
2 , 8 7 4 . 2 5 
1 3 , 6 7 6 . 7 6 
1 3 , 8 5 8 . 5 8 
Total Carry Over Points Honored by Brite: 34,268.09 
Balance of Carry Over Points 
as of February 1, 1991: 16,100.72 
Minimum number of months remaining at the 
highest level of compensation: 1 3 . 4 Months 
Value o f t h e balance of the Carry Over P o i n t s : $ 3 4 , 1 9 6 
tbl2.436 
Cumulative Carry Over Points as of year end. 
PLAVNT1FF 
Exhibit C 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW 
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS 
SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Deanna KLEINERT, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; HRB Company aka 
The Boyer 
Company, a Utah corporation; The Boyer 
Company, a general partnership; 185 
South State Associa tes aka Boyer 
Foothills Partnership, Ltd., a limited 
partnership; Boyer-Gardner Properties 
Partnership, a general partnership; H. 
Roger Boyer, an individual; Kem C. 
Gardner, an individual; and 185 South 
State Owners' Association, a Utah 
corporation, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 940485-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 19, 1995. 
Fred R. Silvester and Clark A. McClellan, 
Silvester & Conray, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
S. Baird Morgan and H. Burt Ringwood, 
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellees. 
Before ORME, P.J., and BENCH and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge. 
*1 Deanna Kleinert appeals from the trial 
court's grant of the Boyer Company's motion 
for a directed verdict. We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
[1] In reviewing a grant of a directed verdict, 
we view all facts and the inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. See, e.g., Management 
Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n 
v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 
(Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 
68, 71, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973). We recite 
the facts accordingly. 
In Apiil 1984, Kleinert entered an elevator 
on the sixth floor of a building owned and 
operated by the Boyer Company. Kleinert 
was trapped inside the elevator for about forty 
minutes while it intermittently and 
erratically rose and fell. Kleinert was thrown 
about the elevator striking her head, arms, 
and legs against the walls, doors, and 
handrail. Kleinert was finally able to escape 
by prying the doors open and jumping to the 
floor below. Kleinert claims to have suffered 
severe permanent physical injury and pain as 
a result of this incident. 
Kleinert brought a strict products liability 
claim against Kimball Elevator Company 
(Kimball). Thereafter, Kleinert amended her 
complaint to assert a negligence claim against 
the Boyer Company. Kimball and the Boyer 
Company separately moved for summary 
judgment. The trial court granted both 
motions and Kleinert appealed to this court. 
See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 
P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993) (Kleinert I ) . 
This court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Kimball, 
concluding that summary judgment was 
appropriate because Kleinert had not shown 
that there was any defect in the elevators at 
the time Kimball sold them to the Boyer 
Company. Id. at 1027. This court reversed 
and remanded the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Boyer 
Company, concluding that Kleinert had 
submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the Boyer Company had notice of a dangerous 
condition. Id. at 1028. 
On remand, Kleinert presented the evidence 
referred to in her appellate brief in Kleinert I, 
Copr. fy) West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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as well as additional evidence of problems or 
malfunctions with the elevators. Kleinert 
submitted evidence tha t some of the problems 
and malfunctions involving the tripping of 
governor switches could cause an elevator to 
stop abruptly. According to Brent Russon, 
Kimball 's district manager, such a stop could 
cause an occupant of the elevator to lose his or 
her balance. Russon also testified that the 
elevators experienced "yo-yoing" problems, as 
well as problems with earthquake devices and 
on-board computers. [FN1] Russon further 
testified that he spoke with a representative of 
the Boyer Company about the operational 
problems with the elevators prior to Kleinert's 
incident. 
Edward Williams, a Kimball repairman, 
testified about specific service calls he 
responded to in the Boyer Company building 
prior to Kleinert's incident. Williams testified 
tha t he responded to problems with governor 
switches, "yo-yoing," and people stuck in 
elevators, as well as problems that had no 
apparent cause. Williams also testified that 
when a governor switch is tripped the elevator 
may stop abruptly. 
*2 Several other witnesses testified that 
they had been trapped in the elevators prior to 
the date of Kleinert 's incident. One witness 
testified that she, as well as others in the 
building, knew the elevators were "bad" and 
that they were "afraid" of them. 
Kleinert submitted copies of Kimball's 
service logs for the elevators covering the 
period prior to Kleinert 's incident. These logs 
show numerous reports of elevator problems 
and malfunctions. Kleinert also submitted 
evidence indicating that the Boyer Company 
was aware of the elevator problems prior to 
the incident. There was testimony presented 
that Kimball as well as others reported the 
elevator problems to the Boyer Company. 
After the close of Kleinert 's case-in-chief, 
the Boyer Company moved for a directed 
verdict claiming tha t there was no evidence 
that the Boyer Company had knowledge, 
either actual or constructive, of any defective 
or dangerous condition in the elevators. The 
trial court granted the Boyer Company's 
motion and this appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
Kleinert raises the following issues on 
appeal: (1) whether the trial court properly 
granted the Boyer Company's motion for a 
directed verdict; (2) whether the Boyer 
Company should be held to the "common 
carrier" standard of care; and (3) whether this 
case should be assigned to a different trial 
judge on remand because the present trial 
judge is biased against her claim. 
ANALYSIS 
Directed Verdict 
[2] Kleinert argues that the trial court erred, 
in granting the Boyer Company's motion for a 
directed verdict, by concluding that there was 
no evidence that the Boyer Company knew, or 
reasonably should have known, of dangerous 
conditions in the elevators. We agree. 
[3] On appeal from a directed verdict, "we 
must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom tha t would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained." Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural 
Educ. Rec. Ass'n., 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d at 
898). Where there is any evidence tha t raises 
a question of material fact, no mat ter how 
improbable the evidence may appear, 
judgment as a matter of law is improper. See 
Hill v. Seattle First Nat ' l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 
246 (Utah 1992). 
Property owners generally have "a duty to 
exercise reasonable care toward their tenants 
in all circumstances." Gregory v. Fourthwest 
Invs. Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App.1988) 
(quoting Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 
(Utah 1985)). "When a ... claim is based on 
the owner's failure to repair ra ther than on 
affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has the 
burden of showing the owner knew, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have known, a 
Copr. M West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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dangerous condition existed and the owner 
had sufficient time to take corrective action." 
Kleinert I, 854 P.2d at 1028. 
*3 In the present case, Kleinert submitted 
testimonial and documentary evidence 
indicating a history of elevator problems and 
malfunctions. While we make no conclusion 
with respect to the weight and veracity of 
Kleiner t ' s evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to Kleinert, the evidence was 
sufficient to raise a genuine question of 
mater ia l fact as to whether the Boyer 
Company "knew, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should have known, a dangerous 
condition existed and ... had sufficient time to 
take corrective action." Id. 
We therefore conclude that because Kleinert 
submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine question of material fact, the trial 
court erred by granting the Boyer Company's 
motion for a directed verdict. 
Standard of Care 
[4] Kleinert also argues that the Boyer 
Company should be held to the common-
carrier standard of care. Having submitted 
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
mater ia l fact under the standard of care 
applicable to property owners generally, 
Kleinert has also necessarily raised a genuine 
issue of material fact under the higher 
s tandard of care applicable to common 
carriers. However, since the legal issue of 
whether an elevator operator should be held to 
a common-carrier standard of care is likely to 
resurface on remand, we address the merits of 
Kleiner t ' s claim. See State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992) (holding it 
appropriate to address issues that, while not 
necessary to resolve appeal, may arise on 
remand). 
After Kleinert I was decided, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993), 
which discussed the standard of care to be 
applied to amusement ride operators. Id. at 
930. In Lamb, the supreme court stated that 
M[t]he heightened standard of care required of 
common carriers is predicated on the principle 
that '[p]ersons using ordinary transportation 
devices, such as elevators and buses, normally 
expect to be carried safely, securely, and 
without incident to their destination.' " Id. 
(quoting Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia, 
Inc., 250 Ga. 352, 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (1982) 
(emphasis added)). The court further discussed 
the rationale behind the common-carrier 
standard of care: 
The "reasonably prudent person" standard of 
care is a flexible legal concept requiring a 
greater or lesser degree of care according to 
the nature of the circumstances that a 
reasonably prudent person would consider in 
assessing possible risks of injury. Common 
carriers are held to a higher standard of care 
than the "reasonably prudent person" 
standard. See Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah 
218, 225, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (1952); see also 
McMaster v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 108 
Utah 207, 210, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945); 
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 
296, 147 P.2d 875, 879 (1944). Passengers 
entrust common carriers with their personal 
safety, have little if any opportunity to 
protect themselves from harm caused by a 
common canier, and pay the carrier for safe 
transportation. In addition, the public has 
an important stake in having the public 
transportation of persons be as safe as 
possible. 
*4Id. 
While the court's statement in Lamb about 
elevator owners being common carriers was 
dictum, a number of other jurisdictions have 
held that elevator owners are held to the 
common-canier standard of care. See, e.g., 
Wyatt v. Otis Elevator Co., 921 F.2d 1224, 
1227 (11th Cir.1991) (stating tha t "Alabama 
treats a passenger elevator as a common 
carrier and requires that one maintaining a 
passenger elevator must exercise the highest 
degree of care"); White v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 242 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir.1957) (holding 
"in Virginia owners of elevators are common 
carriers and held to the highest degree of care 
known to human prudence"); Jardine v. 
Rubloff, 73 m.2d 31, 21 HLDec. 868, 872-73, 
382 N.E.2d 232, 236-37 (1978) (holding 
"owners of buildings with elevators are viewed 
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as common carriers who owe their passengers 
the highest degree of care"); Cash v. Otis 
Elevator Co , 210 Mont 319, 684 P.2d 1041, 
1043 (1984) iholding that elevator owners are 
subject to the common-carrier standard of 
care); Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d 1202, 1205 
(Okla.Ct.App. 1975) (holding "[t]he owner of 
passenger elevators owes to the passengers 
using the same the highest degree of care, 
vigilance, and precaution"). 
In light of the supreme court's statement in 
Lamb, the preceding authorities, and sound 
public policy, we believe that elevator owners 
should be held to the common-carrier standard 
of care. The elevator performs the function of 
a common carrier by transporting people from 
one floor to another. The public places its 
t rust in those who furnish elevators that they 
will be transported safely from one floor to 
another. Once passengers enter an elevator, 
they surrender all control of their situation 
and place their safety entirely in the hands of 
the owner. Furthermore, the risk presented 
when transporting passengers vertically is as 
great as transporting passengers horizontally 
in a conveyance such as a bus or train. See 
Smith, 532 P.2d at 1205. We therefore 
conclude that elevator owners are required to 
exercise the standard of care applicable to 
common earners. 
Judicial Bias 
[5] Kleinert argues, for the first time on 
appeal, tha t this case should be remanded to a 
new t r ia l judge because the present trial judge 
has developed a bias against her claim. 
"We are governed by the general principle 
tha t mat ters not put in issue before the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 
(Utah App. 1992); accord Wade v. Stangl, 869 
P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994). This principle 
applies with equal force where the bias or 
prejudice of a trial judge is alleged for the first 
t ime on appeal. Wade, 869 P.2d at 11 Rule 
63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Whenever a party to any action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney 
shall make and file an affidavit tha t the 
judge before whom such action or proceeding 
is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his 
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to 
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further 
therein, except to call in another judge to 
hear and determine the matter. 
*5 "This rule requires that a party alleging 
judicial bias or prejudice must first file an 
affidavit to that effect in the tr ial court." 
Wade, 869 P.2d at 11; accord Haslam v. 
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 
(1948) (holding issue of bias or prejudice a 
matter determined by trial court "in the first 
instance," subject to appellate review); Sukin, 
842 P.2d at 926; see also Utah Code 
Jud.Conduct, Canon 3(E) (providing examples 
of potential grounds for disqualification). We 
will not therefore address the issue of judicial 
bias because it is raised for the first t ime on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Kleinert submitted evidence sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the Boyer Company was negligent. 
The trial court therefore erred by granting the 
Boyer Company's motion for a directed 
verdict. On remand, the trial court should 
apply the common-carrier standard of care to 
Kleinert 's claim. Any claim of bias must be 
presented to the tr ial court. 
Reversed and remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
ORME, P. J., and BILLINGS, J., concur. 
FN1 A Kimball technician, testified that "yo-yoing" 
is the process whereby an elevator attempts to level 
off when it reaches a floor He stated that when an 
elevator reaches a floor it might overshoot the floor 
by several inches and then move up and down until 
it levels off with the floor 
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b a s i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n d u c t amounted t o a b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . 
The c o u r t , h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d a l l the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by 
p l a i n t i f f s , and h a v i n g h e a r d d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion f o r D i r e c t e d 
V e r d i c t and t h e arguments of p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l i n o p p o s i t i o n 
1 
thereto, determined that no factual issues existed concerning the 
breach of contract issue and that defendant was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiffs' causes of action were all founded on the 
underlying contention that defendant's 1991 redemption of "carry-
over points" amounted to a breach of contract. The court finds 
that a contractual relationship did exist between the parties 
based on the 1982 marketing program implemented by defendant 
although the precise legal nature of such contractual 
relationship, for purposes of defendant's motion, need not be 
defined* The relevant provision of the 1982 marketing program 
concerning "carry-over points" provided: 
"As you continue to exceed 1200 points per 
month, the increasing carry-over points may 
accumulate for as long as you desire. 
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over 
points is redeemable for a check from Brite 
for $100. Redeeming points in this manner 
does not affect your life-time point 
accumulation or the benefits you may 
eventually derive therefrom* " 
2. The court finds that the foregoing marketing program 
language is unambiguous and that the use of the term "However" at 
the beginning of the second sentence thereof acts as a 
qualification to the accumulation provision contained in the 
first sentence. Thus, the ability of plaintiffs to continue 
accumulating carry-over points indefinitely is limited by the 
redemption wording in the second sentence. 
2 
2> Defendant's redemption of p l a i n t i f f s ' carry-over points 
i 
in 1991 was made consistent with the foregoing provision of the 
1982 marketing program in that each increment of 5,000 carry-
over points held by plaintiffs at that tine was redeemed for $100 
from defendant. 
4. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proving 
that defendant's redemption of plaintiffs' carry-over points in 
1991 constituted a breach of the foregoing 1982 marketing program 
provisions. Plaintiffs' position that the right of redemption is 
exclusively theirs and cannot be exercised by defendant is not 
supported by the clear language of the provision itself. 
Accordingly, defendant's Motion For a Directed Verdict is 
HEREBY GRANTED and plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, no cause 
of action, with each party to bear its own costs and fees 
incurred herein. 
DATED t h i s i ^7 
# 
day of January , 1995. 
BY THE C0U3T: 
GLENN K. IrtASAKI 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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